On The Effect of Replacement Policies on The Security of Randomized Cache Architectures

Moritz Peters, Nicolas Gaudin, Jan Philipp Thoma, Vianney Lapôtre, Pascal Cotret, Guy Gogniat, Tim Güneysu

19th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM AsiaCCS 2024) — 2024

Randomizing the mapping of addresses to cache entries has proven to be an effective technique for hardening caches against contention-based attacks like Prime+Prome. While attacks and defenses are still evolving, it is clear that randomized caches significantly increase the security against such attacks. However, one aspect that is missing from most analyses of randomized cache architectures is the choice of the replacement policy. Often, only the random- and LRU replacement policies are investigated. However, LRU is not applicable to randomized caches due to its immense hardware overhead, while the random replacement policy is not ideal from a performance and security perspective.

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