<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>RISC-V on Pascal Cotret</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/tags/risc-v/</link><description>Recent content in RISC-V on Pascal Cotret</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://pcotret.gitlab.io/tags/risc-v/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Enclave-Aware Cache Replacement for Trusted Execution Environments</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2026-cotret-fetch/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2026-cotret-fetch/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Presentation at this workshop.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Enforcing RISC-V TEE Security Against Cache Timing Attacks</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2025-elmnaouri-cryptarchi/</link><pubDate>Sun, 15 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2025-elmnaouri-cryptarchi/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Confidential computing includes various methods to enhance data security, notably by processing sensitive information within TEE. However, TEE remain vulnerable to SCA, such as cache timing attacks, which exploit timing variations to extract confidential data. Existing TEE designs do not provide sufficient protection against these threats, highlighting the need for stronger security measures. This study focuses on integrating countermeasures specifically targeting timing and cache vulnerabilities within a TEE. The implementation will leverage the RISC-V architecture to explore its potential in mitigating SCA within TEE.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>A Fine-Grained Dynamic Partitioning Against Cache-Based Timing Attacks via Cache Locking</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-isvlsi/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-isvlsi/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Cache-based timing side-channel attacks are prevalent and correspond to a security threat for both high-end and embedded processors. In this paper, we propose and implement a fine-grained dynamic partitioning countermeasure relying on a hardware-software collaboration. The proposed approach extends the RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) with lock and unlock instructions to allow a program to explicitly lock cache lines in the data cache memory, ensuring constant-time accesses. Experimental results show that the proposed solution defeats contention-based cache side-channel attacks such as Prime+probe and leads to a low area overhead (&amp;lt;3%), a low impact on binary code size (&amp;lt;0.3 %) and a low impact on miss rate (&amp;lt;2%).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Verrouillage des lignes de cache pour la lutte contre les attaques par canaux auxiliaires exploitant les mémoires cache</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-cob/</link><pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-cob/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Presentation at this workshop.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Cache locking against cache-based side-channel attacks</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-fetch/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Feb 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2024-gaudin-fetch/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Presentation at this workshop.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>JIT Compiler Security through Low-Cost RISC-V Extension</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2023-ducasse-raw/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2023-ducasse-raw/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Language Virtual Machines (VM) need to be extremely efficient and hence use complex engines such as a JIT compiler to speed up the usual bytecode interpretation loop. Their usage of low-level and security-critical tasks make them targets of choice. Enforcing low-cost fine-grained memory isolation has been an important research focus as a countermeasure to the most advanced JIT attacks. Memory isolation splits the components of an application with controlled communication and verified access to other resources. We present how custom instructions linked to hardware-enforced domain-checking could protect JIT code and data. We present incremental solutions and their corresponding custom instructions. The generated machine code and extended RISC-V Rocket come at a low-cost both in performance and intrusiveness.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Work in Progress: Thwarting Timing Attacks in Microcontrollers using Fine-grained Hardware Protections</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2023-gaudin-silm/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2023-gaudin-silm/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Timing side-channels are an identified threat for security critical software. Existing countermeasures have a cost either on the hardware requirements or execution time. We focus on low-cost microcontrollers that have a very low computational capacity. Although these processors do not feature out-of-order execution or speculation, they remain vulnerable to timing attacks exploiting the varying latencies of ALU operations or memory accesses.We propose to augment the RISC-V ISA with security primitives that have a guaranteed timing behavior. These primitives allow constant time ALU operations and memory accesses that do not alter the state of the cache. Our approach has a low overhead in terms of hardware cost, binary code size, and execution time both for the constant time secure program and other programs running concurrently on the same hardware.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Remarkable Challenges of High-Performance Language Virtual Machines</title><link>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2022-polito-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://pcotret.gitlab.io/publications/2022-polito-report/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Language Virtual Machines (VMs) are pervasive in every laptop, server, and smartphone, as is the case with Java or Javascript. They allow application portability between different platforms and better usage of resources. They are used in critical applications such as stock exchange, banking, insurance, and health [25]. Virtual machines are an important asset in companies because they allow the efficient execution of high-level programming languages. Nowadays, they even attract investments from large non-system companies, e.g., Netflix 1 , Meta 2 , Shopify 3 and Amazon 4. VMs achieve high-performance thanks to aggressive optimization techniques that observe and adapt the execution dynamically, either by doing just-in-time compilation [5] or by adapting the memory management strategies at runtime [90, 91]. For all these reasons Virtual Machines are highly-complex engineering pieces, often handcrafted by experts, that mix state-of-the-art compilation techniques with complex memory management that collaborate with the underlying operating systems and hardware. However, besides some well-known techniques that are published in research venues, most knowledge and technology around virtual machines are highly concentrated in large companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Oracle, making Virtual Machine construction difficult, and experiments difficult to reproduce and replicate. Language VMs present many multidisciplinary scientific challenges that appear at the intersection of fields such as hardware, system software, compiler, and software language engineering. This document aims to give a brief overview of the current challenges the VM community faces. To keep this document short, we selected remarkable challenges in managed execution, managed memory, performance evaluation, software engineering and security.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>